This post highlighted the first ever Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) enforcement action against Ada Evila Serrano Nunez (Serrano) a Honduran citizen who resided in Georgia who, from approximately July 2022 through March 2026, served as Consul General at the Honduran Consulate in Atlanta.
This post highlights additional issues to consider from the enforcement action.
FEPA Not Needed
The narrative advanced by some regarding FEPA has generally been that the law was needed to fill a “gap” in the FCPA given that the FCPA only captures the-so-called “supply” side of foreign bribery and not the so-called “demand-side” of foreign bribery.
That narrative has generally failed to acknowledge the DOJ has long used other criminal statutes (most often money laundering laws) to criminally charge “foreign officials” in connection with alleged bribery schemes.
Indeed, by my count, since FEPA was enacted in 2023 (the current version was enacted in 2024), the DOJ has criminally charged foreign officials with money laundering offenses six times in connection with bribery schemes. See here, here, here, here, here, and here.
Serrano was also charged with money laundering conspiracy with the specified unlawful activity being an “offense against a foreign nation involving bribery of a public official, and the misappropriation, theft, and embezzlement of public funds by and for the benefit of a public official, in violation of the Honduran Penal Code.”
In other words, FEPA was not necessarily needed to criminally charge Serrano in connection with the alleged bribery scheme.
What About The Payor?
In many FCPA enforcement actions, the question often arose: what about the bribe recipient?
Now that there is a FEPA enforcement action, the question arises: what about the payor?
According to the Serrano indictment, the payor was Consular Services Company (a private company registered to do business in Tennessee) and was a “domestic concern” under FEPA (which borrows the definition of “domestic concern” found in the FCPA). In other words, Consular Services Company was “any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”
The Serrano indictment also mentions Individual #1 (a citizen of the U.S. and Honduras residing in Tennessee) who was the owner of Consular Services Company and Individual #2 (a Honduran citizen who resided in Tennessee) who was an employee of Consular Services Company.
Both Individual #1 and Individual #2 are also described as “domestic concerns” under FEPA – which again borrows the definition of “domestic concern” found in the FCPA. In other words, Individual #1 and #2 were an “individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States.”
As “domestic concerns” will Consular Services Company and/or Individuals #1 and #2 be charged – in connection with the same alleged bribery scheme – with violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions?
Time will tell of course.
But then again, the “bribes” paid to Serrano might be facilitation payments under the FCPA. If so, such a categorization may not necessary prevent criminal charges from being filed as facilitation payments are a statutory exception and the DOJ has long brought FCPA charges concerning alleged bribe payments that arguably fit within the exception.
But whether the DOJ would be able to negate that exception if put to its burden of proof is an open question. As highlighted here, in SEC v. Jackson & Ruehlen a judge ruled that the government has the burden of negating application of the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception.
Here is what is known about the alleged bribe payments to Serrano from the indictment.
“In general, Honduran nationals, travelers, and citizens living in the United States who sought services at the Consulate – such as obtaining passports and travel documents, notary services, and other civil records -were required to schedule an appointment through the Consulate’s online appointment system and attend those appointments with the required documentation and information. Under that system, the Consulate offered a limited number of appointments per day.
As part of its business, Consular Services Company scheduled appointments for its clients at the Consulate and provided them with transportation to and from the Consulate and Tennessee. Consular Services Company charged its clients for scheduling the appointments and transporting them to and from the Consulate. Prior to Ada Serrono’s appointment as Consul General, Consular Services Company was not required to pay the Consulate, or any consular employee, to arrange for their clients to access appointments at the Consulate to obtain consular services.”
But things changed in July 2023 as the indictment alleges that Serrono “instructed Consulate Employee, who was then working as a security guard at the Consulate, to require Individual #1 and Individual #2 to pay a bribe for each person who Consular Services Company transported to the Consulate.”
The indictment continues:
“In general, Consular Services Company charged each of its clients approximately $300 for assisting them in obtaining services at the Consulate. This amount covered transportation to and from the Consulate and the cost of the bribes demanded by Ada Serrano.
In exchange for the bribes, Ada Serono allowed Consular Services Company to gain access to appointments at the Consulate that they would otherwise be denied. This access allowed Consular Services Company’s clients to attend the appointments necessary to secure passports, identification documents, and other services from the Consulate. Ada Serrono directed Consulate Employee and Co-Conspirator #3 to coordinate directly with Individual #1 and Individual #2 to ensure Consular Service Company’s clients were allowed into the Consulate after they paid the bribes.”
Were the “bribes” Consular Service Company and Individuals #1 and #2 paid to Serrono facilitation payments under the FCPA?
The FCPA states that the anti-bribery provisions “shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official.”
The term “routine governmental action” is defined to “man only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in:
“(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.”
The FCPA further states that the “term “routine governmental action” does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party.”
Facilitation Payment Not Relevant Under FEPA
A question posed in this 2023 post, was “what happens if what the foreign official is demanding, seeking, etc. qualifies as a facilitation payment under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions?”
It was noted that FEPA is silent on this issue.
