In 2024, the DOJ criminally charged various individuals in connection with an alleged Indian bribery scheme. (See here for the prior post).
Gautam Adani (a citizen of India and founder of the Adani Group which includes numerous portfolio companies including Adani Green Energy – and Indian energy company) was charged with securities fraud conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy.
Sagar Adani (a citizen of India and Gautam Adani’s nephew and Executive Director of Adani Green’s Board of Directors) was charged with securities fraud conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy.
Vneet Jaain (a citizen of India who was the CEO of Adani Green and who is currently the Managing Director of Adani Green’s Board of Directors) was charged with securities fraud conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy.
Ranjit Gupta (a citizen of India who was the CEO of Azure Power Global Limited and CEO and Managing Director of an Azure subsidiary) was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Cyril Cabanes (a citizen of Australia and France who was previously a member of the board of directors of Azure served as a representative of the company’s largest stockholder, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (“CDPQ”) was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to obstruct justice.
Saurabh Agarwal (a citizen of India employed by CDPQ who reported to Cabanes) was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to obstruct justice.
Deepak Malhotra (a citizen of India employed by CDPA who was a member of the board of directors of Azure) was with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to obstruct justice.
Rupesh Agarwal (a citizen of India who served as a consultant for Azure and then as Chief Strategy and Commercial Officer for Azure) was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and and conspiracy to obstruct justice.
In connection with the same core conduct alleged by the DOJ, the SEC also charged Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani with securities fraud and also charged Cabanes with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. (See here for the prior post).
On May 18th, the DOJ filed a consent motion stating:
“The government respectfully submits this motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), requesting that the Court dismiss the indictment in this case with prejudice. The Department of Justice has reviewed this case and has decided, in its prosecutorial discretion, not to devote further resources to these criminal charges against individual defendants.”
The motion has sitting on the docket of Judge Nicholas Garaufis (E.D.N.Y.).
On June 24th, lawyers for Gautam Adani, Sagar Adani, and Vneet Jaain wrote Judge Garaufis asking the court to grant the DOJ’s motion to dismiss.
The letter stated:
“Rule 48(a) authorizes the DOJ, “with leave of court,” to “dismiss an indictment.” As Judge Chen recently recognized when granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss in the FIFA case, the “leave of court” requirement confers on the Court “very little authority” to deny the DOJ’s motion under Rule 48(a). United States v. Webb; see United States v. Blaszczak, 56 F.4th 230, 240 (2d Cir. 2022) (“The Executive remains . . . presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. The exercise of its discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest.”) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority.”).
Similarly, as Judge Ho recently explained, a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 48(a) motion does not amount to an “opinion as to the merits of the case or whether the prosecution . . . ‘should’ move forward,” and the district court “has no authority to require that [the prosecution] continue.” United States v. Adams, 777 F. Supp. 3d 185, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). The DOJ “may elect to eschew or discontinue prosecutions for any of a number of reasons,” and “[r]arely will the judiciary overrule the Executive Branch’s exercise of these prosecutorial decisions.” Blaszczak, 56 F.4th at 238. Because a district court’s discretion under Rule 48(a) “involves the constitutional issue of the Separation of Powers Doctrine,” the DOJ remains “presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated.” Id. at 240 (quotation omitted).
As to the scope of the Court’s limited discretion, “the primary purpose of [Rule 48(a)] is protection of a defendant’s rights.” United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.” Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Salinas, 693 F.2d at 353 (finding that the Government’s “true reason for dismissal was in derogation of defendant Salinas’ rights”). For this reason, “it appears that no appellate court has upheld a denial of a motion to dismiss, where the defendant has consented to the dismissal, grounded on a finding of ‘bad faith’ or action ‘contrary to the public interest’ alone.” United States v. KPMG LLP, 2007 WL 541956, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2007) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here, the DOJ has moved to dismiss the Indictment “with prejudice” and with consent of the Adani DOJ Defendants, and so there is no prospect of prosecutorial harassment.”
On June 26th, Judge Garaufis issued an order stating:
“Now, the Government seeks to abandon this case. With Defendants’ consent, the Government moves to dismiss the Indictment with prejudice as against all Defendants, pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. To support the motion, the Government states, in full: “The Department of Justice has reviewed this case and has decided, in its prosecutorial discretion, not to devote further resources to these criminal charges against individual defendants.”
Rule 48(a) provides that “the government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a); see also United States v. Blaszczak, 56 F.4th 230, 238 (2d Cir. 2022) (same). Consequently, “Rule 48(a) requires that the government set forth the basis for its motion to dismiss.” United States v. Adams, 777 F. Supp. 3d 185, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Derr, 726 F.2d 617,619 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he trial court at the very least must know the prosecutor’s reasons for seeking to dismiss the indictment and the facts
underlying the prosecutor’s decision.”). In other words, Rule 48 (a) is a “sunshine provision” pursuant to which the “prosecutor is under an obligation to supply sufficient reasons” supporting the Government’s dismissal of an indictment. In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 788 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 1982).Here, the Government’s terse, bland, and conclusory statement affords the court neither a sufficient basis to reach any conclusion, nor the opportunity to conduct any analysis of the Government’s request for dismissal.
Thus, the Government has failed to meet its obligation to supply adequate reasoning and sufficient facts to support dismissal of the Indictment. And, without this additional information, the court cannot fulfill its own obligation to exercise “sound judicial discretion in considering [the Government’s] request for dismis sal.” 3B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 802 ( 4th ed. April 2026 update) (“Since the court must exercise sound judicial discretion in considering a request for dismissal, it must have sufficient factual information supporting the recommendation.”). In fact, without the Government’s reasoning and factual bases for dismissal, the court risks abusing its discretion in deciding the motion. See Adams, 777 F. Supp. 3d at 208 (adding that “a district court abuses its discretion if it does not articulate its reasons for granting or denying leave, and it cannot discharge its duties properly unless the underlying motion accurately states the government’s reasons for dismissal”)
For these reasons, the Government is DIRECTED to advise the court of each reason for dismissing the Indictment with prejudice as against all Defendants and to provide the court with sufficient factual support for each basis. The Government must do so no later than Monday, July 13, 2026.”
