This previous post highlighted specifics from the recent Marubeni Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action and this post continues the coverage by discussing various items of note.
Do Legal Principles Even Matter?
Forgive me for being the law guy, but in the aftermath of the Marubeni enforcement action, like so many others, one can legitimately ask – do legal principles even matter?
As highlighted in the previous post, the most recent alleged overt act in support of Marubeni’s conspiracy charge allegedly occurred in November 2008. In other words, all of the alleged conduct supporting the conspiracy charge was beyond the five year statute of limitations applicable to FCPA offenses.
In addition, the information also charged 7 substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations. One charge concerned a 2005 wire transfer, three charges concerned 2006 wire transfers, one charge concerned a 2007 wire transfer, and one charge concerned a 2008 wire transfer. In other words, 6 of the 7 substantive FCPA anti-bribery charges concerned alleged conduct beyond the five year limitations period applicable to FCPA offenses. (Note: the final substantive FCPA charge was based on an October 2009 wire transfer made, not by any Marubeni employee, but Alstom employees).
In corporate FCPA enforcement actions, companies often enter into tolling agreements and statute of limitations can also otherwise be extended in other ways, but the DOJ’s criminal information and plea agreement are silent as to any of these issues relevant to statute of limitations.
Is Marubeni A Recidivist?
As noted in the original Marubeni post, last week’s $88 million FCPA enforcement action followed closely on the heels of Marubeni exiting a deferred prosecution agreement from its 2012 FCPA enforcement action based on conduct at Bonny Island, Nigeria. (See here for the prior post).
Against this backdrop, it is tempting to call Marubeni an FCPA recidivist.
However, as noted in Marubeni’s release (a release that the DOJ needed to approve per the plea agreement) “the Tarahan conduct pre-dates the execution of Marubeni’s 2012 Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the DOJ.”
At the very least, Marubeni is a repeat FCPA offender and joins a category that also includes IBM, Tyco, Aibel Group, General Electric, Diebold (at least as to books and records and internal controls issues) and Ashland Oil (at least in theory given that the first enforcement action occurred prior to passage of the FCPA in 1977).
The distinction Marubeni has among the group though is the shortest gap between enforcement actions.
More Details Please As to Lack of Cooperation
As noted in the previous post, the $88 million Marubeni enforcement action was a relatively rare instance of a company paying a criminal fine within the advisory guidelines range. The plea agreement includes the DOJ’s justification as to why, including Marubeni’s lack of cooperation. However, the plea agreement merely states that Marubeni refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigation when given the opportunity to do so.
It sure would have been nice for the DOJ to provide some additional details regarding Marubeni’s apparent lack of cooperation.
For instance, in the Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action against JGC Corp. (also a Japanese company), the DOJ stated that the company declined “to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments?”
The DOJ’s statement motivated this prior post, “Does the DOJ Except FCPA Counsel to Roll Over and Play Dead?”
While the DOJ declined to provide specifics as to Marubeni’s lack of cooperation, it would be truly frightening if the DOJ’s position is that a company is not cooperating if it raises purely legal issues such as jurisdiction or statute of limitations.
FCPA Enforcement Statistics
FCPA enforcement statistics are literally all over the map given the creative and unique ways in which many FCPA Inc. participants keep such statistics. (For instance, see this prior post for visual proof).
As I have long maintained, the most reliable and accurate way to keep FCPA enforcement statistics is by using the “core” approach, an approach to tracking FCPA enforcement endorsed by the DOJ and a commonly accepted method used in other areas.
Consider the stark difference in approaches using just the Marubeni enforcement action and the April 2013 FCPA enforcement action against current and former employees of Alstom. The enforcement actions were virtual carbon copies of each other involving the same project in Indonesia, involving the same alleged “foreign officials,” the same consultants, Marubeni was a central actor in the Alstom related action and the Alstom employees were central actors in the Marubeni enforcement action.
In short, the Marubeni and Alstom related action were the same “core” action.
However, many in FCPA Inc. will no doubt count these actions as five enforcement actions: Marubeni and Alstom employees Frederic Pierucci, David Rothschild, Lawrence Hoskins and William Pomponi. Make that six enforcement actions when – in all likelihood – Alstom resolves an enforcement action based, in whole or in part, on the same conduct. In short, by tracking FCPA enforcement statistics this way the statistics will be distorted.
