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Once Again, Rebooting A Long-Standing FCPA Proposal, This Time In The Aftermath Of A Recent Disclosure By Ciena


Including the first time I proposed this concept in 2010, this is the 10th time I have written this general post (see herehereherehereherehereherehere and here for the previous versions) and until things change I will keep writing it which means I will probably keep writing this same general post long into the future.

The proposal is this: when a company voluntarily discloses an FCPA internal investigation to the DOJ and/or SEC and when one or both of the enforcement agencies do not bring an enforcement action, have the enforcement agency publicly state, in a thorough and transparent mannerthe facts the company disclosed and why the enforcement agency did not bring an enforcement action based on those facts.

As highlighted in this prior post, in late 2017 Ciena Corp. (a Maryland-based technology company) disclosed:

“During fiscal 2017, one of Ciena’s third-party vendors raised allegations about certain questionable payments to one or more individuals employed by a customer in a country in the ASEAN region. Ciena promptly initiated an internal investigation into the matter, with the assistance of outside counsel, which investigation corroborated direct and indirect payments to one such individual and sought to determine whether the payments may have violated applicable laws and regulations, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). In September 2017, Ciena voluntarily contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to advise them of the relevant events and the findings of Ciena’s internal investigation. With the direct oversight of the Board, Ciena continues to cooperate fully with the SEC and DOJ in their review of the investigation.

Ciena’s operations in the relevant country have constituted less than 1.5% of consolidated revenues as reported by Ciena in each fiscal year since 2012. Ciena does not currently anticipate that this matter will have a material adverse effect on its business, financial condition or results of operations. However, as discussions with the SEC and DOJ are ongoing, the ultimate outcome of this matter cannot be predicted at this time. As of the filing of this Report, no provision with respect to this matter has been made in Ciena’s consolidated financial statements. Any determination that Ciena’s operations or activities are not in compliance with the FCPA or other applicable laws or regulations could result in the imposition of fines, civil and criminal penalties, and equitable remedies, including disgorgement or injunctive relief.”

As highlighted in this prior post, in late 2018 Ciena disclosed:

“On December 10, 2018, the DOJ advised that it has declined to prosecute this matter and that its investigation into the matter is now closed. Ciena continues to cooperate fully with the SEC in its investigation into this matter.”

Yesterday, Ciena disclosed:

“On September 9, 2019, the SEC advised that it has concluded its investigation into this matter and that its staff does not intend to recommend any enforcement action by the SEC against Ciena.”

If the FCPA enforcement agencies are sincere about transparency in their FCPA enforcement programs as enforcement officials frequently mention, the public (not to mention Ciena shareholders who likely shelled out millions in connection with the investigation if it followed the typical course ) has a right to know the facts the company disclosed and why the enforcement agency did not bring an enforcement action based on those facts even though – as Ciena stated in its disclosure – its internal investigation corroborated that certain direct and indirect questionable payments were made.

Here is why the proposal makes sense and is in the public interest.

For starters (as I first wrote in 2010 and even more relevant today), the DOJ and the SEC are already wildly enthusiastic when it comes to talking about FCPA issues. Enforcement attorneys from both agencies are frequent participants on the FCPA conference circuit and there seems to be no other single law that is the focus of more DOJ or SEC speeches than the FCPA. Thus, there is clearly enthusiasm and ambition at both agencies when it comes to the FCPA.

Further (as I first wrote in 2010 and even more relevant today), both the DOJ and the SEC have the resources to accomplish this task. Both agencies have touted the increased FCPA resources in their respective offices and the new personnel hired to focus on the FCPA. Combine enthusiasm and ambition with sufficient resources and personnel and the proposal certainly seems doable considering that there are likely less than 10 relevant examples per year.

In addition, the DOJ is already comfortable with this type of exercise.

It is called the FCPA Opinion Procedure Release (see here), a process the DOJ frequently urges those subject to the FCPA to utilize. For instance, as highlighted in this prior post Deputy Assistant AG Matthew Miner stated: “not enough companies are taking advantage of this process” and that “the opinion process is a tremendous resource and we want to encourage greater use of it going forward.” Under the Opinion Procedure regulations, an issuer or domestic concern subject to the FCPA can voluntarily disclose prospective business conduct to the DOJ which then has 30 days to respond to the request by issuing an opinion that states whether the prospective conduct would, for purposes of the DOJ’s present enforcement policy, violate the FCPA. The DOJ’s opinions are publicly released and the FCPA bar and the rest of FCPA Inc. study these opinions in advising clients largely because of the general lack of substantive FCPA case law.

If the DOJ is able to issue an enforcement opinion as to voluntarily disclosed prospective conduct there seems to be no principled reason why the enforcement agencies could not issue a non-enforcement opinion as to voluntarily disclosed actual conduct. If the enforcement agencies are sincere about providing guidance on the FCPA, as they presumably are, such agency opinions would seem to provide an ideal platform to accomplish such a purpose.

Requiring the enforcement agencies to disclose non-enforcement decisions after a voluntary disclosure could also inject some much needed discipline into the voluntary disclosure decision itself – a decision which seems to be reflexive in many instances any time facts suggest the FCPA may be implicated.

Notwithstanding the presence of significant conflicting incentives to do otherwise, it is hoped that FCPA counsel would advise clients to disclose only if a reasonably certain legal conclusion has been reached that the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA. There appears to be the case in terms of Ciena as the company disclosed that its internal investigation corroborated that certain direct and indirect questionable payments were made. Thus transparency in FCPA enforcement would be enhanced if the public learned why the enforcement agencies, in the face of such a voluntary disclosure, presumably disagreed with the company’s conclusion as informed by FCPA counsel. If the enforcement agencies agreed with the conclusion that the FCPA was violated, but decided not to bring an enforcement action, transparency in FCPA enforcement would similarly be enhanced if the public learned why.

A final reason in support of the proposal is that it would give the disclosing companies (and others similarly situated) a benefit by contributing to the mix of public information about the FCPA.

In most cases, companies spend millions of dollars investigating conduct that may implicate the FCPA and on the voluntary disclosure process. When the enforcement agencies do not bring an enforcement action, presumably because the FCPA was not violated, these costs are forever sunk and company shareholders can legitimately ask why the company just spent millions investigating and disclosing conduct that the DOJ and the SEC did not conclude violated the FCPA.

However, if the enforcement agencies were required to publicly justify their decision not to bring an enforcement action after a voluntary disclosure, the company would achieve, however small, a return on its investment and contribute to the mix of public information about the FCPA – a law which the company will remain subject to long after its voluntary disclosure and long after the enforcement agencies no enforcement decision. Thus, the company, the company’s industry peers, and indeed all those subject to the FCPA would benefit by learning more about the DOJ and the SEC’s enforcement conclusions.

Transparency, accountability, useful guidance, a return on investment.

All would be accomplished by requiring the enforcement agencies to publicly justify a non-enforcement decision after a voluntary disclosure.

All points to ponder … until the next time I write this same general post.

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