Earlier this week, the DOJ announced the first Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) enforcement action against Ada Evila Serrano Nunez (Serrano), a Honduran citizen who resided in Georgia and served as Consul General at the Honduran Consulate in Atlanta.
Also charged in a separate criminal complaint were Mario Antonio Castellanos Velazquez and Serrano’s two sons – Luis Euceda Serrano and Angel Euceda Serrano. The three individuals were charged with conspiracy to violate FEPA.
Mario Castellanos is described as a dual U.S. and Honduran citizen residing in Georgia who was employed at the Consulate and thus a “foreign official” under FEPA.
The Serrano brothers are described as Honduran citizens residing in Georgia. Even though they are not “foreign officials,” the Serrano brothers were charged with conspiracy to violate FEPA (a law that they themselves are not subject to).
The criminal charges against them would seem to have a U.S. v. Castle problem.
In 1990, the DOJ criminally charged various individuals in connection with an alleged scheme to sell buses to the Saskatchewan, Canada Transportation Company (STC), an alleged instrumentality of the Canadian government. (See here for the prior post).
Among the individuals charged were the “foreign officials” – Donald Castle and Darrell Lowry, both Canadian nationals, and the Vice-President and President, respectively, of STC. Specifically, Castle and Lowry were charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Castle and Lowry moved to dismiss the charge against them on the basis that “as Canadian officials, they cannot be convicted of the offense charged against them.” In this June 1990 Memorandum Opinion and Order (741 F.Supp. 116), the trial court granted the motion. The issues, as framed by the court, were as follows.
“[It is undisputed] that Defendants Castle and Lowry could not be charged with violating the FCPA itself, since the Act does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by a foreign official. The issue here is whether the government may prosecute Castle and Lowry under the general conspiracy statute, 18 USC 371, for conspiring to violate the FCPA. Put more simply, the question is whether foreign officials, whom the government concedes it cannot prosecute under the FCPA itself, may be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute for conspiring to violate the Act.”
The court answered no – Castle and Lowry could not be prosecuted for conspiring to violate a law (the FCPA) that they themselves were not subject to. (See here for a discussion of the court’s reasoning).
The DOJ appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the conspiracy charge against Castle and Lowry. In this March 1991 5th Circuit opinion (925 F.2d 831) the court stated:
“We hold that foreign officials may not be prosecuted under 18 USC 371 for conspiring to violate the FCPA.
As discussed here, in 2018 the Second Circuit rejected a DOJ theory of prosecution in an FCPA enforcement action against Lawrence Hoskins relying in part on U.S. v. Castle and concluding that Hoskins could not be charged with conspiring to violate a law he himself was not subject to.
