Friday Roundup
Another FCPA hearing on Capital Hill next week, news regarding Goldmann Sachs, questioning the use of NPAs and DPAs, an informative read regarding India, and something for your “foreign official” file.
Its all here in the Friday roundup.
House Hearing
Next Tuesday, June 14th, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing titled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” According to this report by Christopher Matthews of Main Justice the hearing is expected to focus on the following issues: successor liability, a potential compliance defense, “foreign official,” and corporate mens rea issues.
The witness list for the hearing is as follows (see here).
Hon. Michael Mukasey (Former Attorney General, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP – see here); Mr. Greg Andres (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Mr. George Terwilliger (Partner, White & Case LLP – see here); and Ms. Shana-Tara Regon (Director, White Collar Crime Policy, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers – see here).
Predictably, some are blasting the very existence of the hearing. For instance, Political Correction, a project of Media Matters Action Network (a self-described progressive research and information center dedicated to analyzing and correcting conservative misinformation in the U.S. media), describes the hearing here as “Rep. Lamar Smith’s Fight to Make Bribery Easier For Big Business.”
The House hearing follows a November 30th Senate hearing titled “Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” See here for a prior post.
This post, prior to the 2010 hearing provided some guiding words, and if those were not enough, how about this statement from William Brock, U.S. Trade Representative, on April 18, 1983 during a hearing before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
“Mr. Chairman, no one minimizes the complexity of the issue before you today. Just because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act spotlights a sensitive subject, some people wish to turn a ‘blind eye’ to its shortcomings rather than risk being accused of being ‘soft on bribery.’ That is too easy a way out. Retreating from controversy will not cure the law’s deficiencies. Such inaction will no more eliminate the need for FCPA reforms today than it can eliminate the criticism of the Act brought over the past several years. After five and on half years experience with this law, after legitimate problems have been identified and examined, we have a responsibility to respond. Is there any U.S. law that ought to be above such review and clarification – especially one as complex as the FCPA.”
Well said.
Goldman Inquiry
Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal reported – “Eyes on Goldman-Libya Dealings” – that the SEC is “examining whether Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other financial firms might have violated bribery laws in dealings with Libya’s sovereign wealth fund.” The inquiry appears to be focused on a “$50 million fee Goldman initially agreed to pay [but one that was never paid to] the Libyan sovereign-wealth fund as part of a proposal … to help the fund recoup losses.”
A Goldman spokesman is quoted as follows. “We are confident that nothing we did or proposed was or could have been a breach of any rule or regulation. We retained outside counsel, as is our normal practice for any transaction to ensure that we were compliant with all applicable rules.”
Can the FCPA be implicated by payments never made?
Yes. The anti-bribery provisions prohibit “an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of payment …”.
What about payments to foreign governments?
No. The anti-bribery provisions only apply to offers, payments, promises of payment, or authorizations of payments to “foreign officials.”
However, according to the WSJ article the inquiry appears to focus on whether the contemplated payment would have been passed on to an outside adviser firm “run at the time by the son-in-law of the head of Libya’s state-owned oil company.”
For more on the Goldman inquiry, see here from Ashby Jones (WSJ Law Blog) and here from Samuel Rubenfeld (WSJ Corruption Currents).
NPAs / DPAs
Non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements ought to be abolished. I’ve argued here and in other places that these agreements have traded one negative externality of white collar prosecution (the much over-hyped Arthur Anderson effect) for a host of others, including the alarming lack of any meaningful judicial scrutiny to ensure that NPAs and DPAs are truly based on facts and appropriate legal theories to support the charges “alleged.”
Mark Mendelsohn, the former head of the DOJ’s FCPA unit during its era of resurgence, stated in a September 2010 interview with Corporate Crime Reporter, that a “danger” with NPAs and DPAs “is that it is tempting” for the DOJ “to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don‟t actually constitute violations of the law.”
Asked directly – if the DOJ “did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year,” Mendelsohn stated as follows: “if the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.”
Add W. Neil Eggleston, a former DOJ enforcement attorney currently a partner at Debevoise (here), to the growing list of former DOJ enforcement attorneys critical of these alternative resolution vehicles.
In this recent interview with Corporate Crime Reporter, Eggleston stated as follows. “I worry that [NPAs and DPAs] will become a substitute for a prosecutor deciding – this is not an appropriate case to bring – there is no reason to subject this corporation to corporate criminal liability. In the old days, they would have dropped the case. Now, they have the back up of seeking a deferred or non prosecution agreement, when in fact the case should not have been pursued at all. That’s what I’m worried about – an easy out.”
Well said.
India
If India is a country of concern or focus of yours, you will want to check out the most recent quarterly newsletter of the India Committee of the ABA Section of International Law. (See here).
Guest editor James Parkinson of BuckleySandler (here) provides the following articles, among others, in the newsletter: one devoted to the FCPA risks of doing business in India; another devoted to India’s demand-side statute – the Prevention of Corruption Act; another focused on reducing corruption risks in India through compliance programs; and another calling for India to join the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
“Foreign Official”
And finally, because your “foreign official” file would be incomplete without it, here is a transcript of the May 9th oral argument in the Carson “foreign official” challenge. See here and here for previous posts.
*****
A good weekend to all.
Judge Selna Concludes “The Question of Whether State-Owned Companies Qualify as Instrumentalities Under the FCPA is a Question of Fact”
Yesterday, U.S. District Court Judge James Selna denied the Carson “foreign official” challenge. See here for his written decision.
Judge Selna concluded that “the question of whether state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalties under the FCPA is a question of fact.”
Judge Selna stated that “several factors bear on the question of whether a business entity constitutes a government instrumentality” including the following.
• The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees;
• The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
• The purpose of the entity’s activities;
• The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law,
including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions;
• The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
• The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including the level of
financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and
loans).
[In April, Judge Howard Matz (C.D. of Cal.), in denying the Lindsey “foreign official” challenge (see here for the prior post) identified the following “non-exclusive list” of “various characteristics of government agencies and departments” that fall within the description of instrumentality:
• The entity provides a service to the citizens – indeed, in many cases to all the inhabitants – of the jurisdiction.
• The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials.
• The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through governmental
appropriations or through revenues obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park.
• The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions.
• The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e., governmental) functions]
Judge Selna stated that his above-listed “factors are not exclusive, and no single factor is dispositive.” “As applicable here, their chief utility is simply to point out that several types of evidence are relevant when determining whether a state-owned company constitutes an ‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA – with state ownership being only one of several considerations. Accordingly, for these reasons and those discussed in more detail below, Defendants’ Motion is not entirely segregable from the evidence to be presented at trial, and therefore must be denied.”
Later in the opinion, Judge Selna stated as follows. “Admittedly, a mere monetary investment in a business entity by the government may not be sufficient to transform that entity into a governmental instrumentality. But when a monetary investment is combined with additional factors that objectively indicate the entity is being used as an instrument to carry out governmental objectives, that business would qualify as a governmental instrumentality.”
Judge Selna found that the “meaning of the statutory text is clear,” “that the meaning of instrumentality should be considered both within the context of the preceding terms of the FCPA [departments and agencies] and in view of the FCPA as a whole,” and that the “use of the term instrumentality in the FCPA produces no such crisp exclusion of a state-owned entity.” Judge Selna stated: “to the contrary, a state-owned entity – just like an agency or department – is a modality through which a government may conduct its business.”
Judge Selna then noted that “the fact that corporations have long been used in this country to carry out governmental objectives supports the conclusion that state-owned companies could be considered an instrumentality.” He stated that “given this country’s long history of using corporations to carry out governmental objectives, the Court rejects the idea that governmental and commercial actions are necessarily incompatible.”
Judge Selna also noted as follows. “The fact that Congress passed FSIA a year before the FCPA, and defined instrumentality to include state-owned companies, ultimately supports the Court’s conclusions that an instrumentality could include such entities under the FCPA.”
Judge Selna found “that the statutory language of the FCPA is clear, that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, and that resort to the legislative history of the FCPA is unnecessary.”
Under the heading “Conclusion for Statutory Construction,” Judge Selna stated as follows. “The Court concludes that some business entities may be considered an instrumentality but this is a fact-specific question that depends on the nature and characteristics of the business entity.” Elsewhere, Judge Selna similarly stated as follows. “state-owned companies may be considered instrumentalities under the FCPA, but whether such companies qualify as instrumentalities is a question of fact.”
*****
Earlier this week, Judge Selna issued an “Order Regarding Briefing Schedule and Hearing Date.”
Among other things, Judge Selna ordered that “the parties shall submit their proposed jury instructions and legal support for the “instrumentality” and scienter instructions on June 30, 2011. Objections to disputed instructions shall be filed no later than July 25, 2011.” “The hearing to address the “instrumentality” and scienter jury instructions, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Travel Act charges, and Defendants’ Grand Jury motions, shall be scheduled for August 12, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.”
Judge Matz Issues Narrow “Foreign Official” Decision / Calls DOJ Post-Hearing Request “Astounding”
As noted in an April 1st post (see here), United States District Judge Howard Matz (C.D. of California) issued an oral ruling denying the Lindsey defendants “foreign official” challenge. See here for a transcript of the hearing.
As noted in the hearing transcript, Judge Matz stated that the “foreign official” challenge “warrants and will receive a very considered written ruling.”
Yesterday, Judge Matz issued his written decision. See here.
According to Judge Matz, “the question presented by the motion is whether an officer or employee of a state-owned corporation can be a ‘foreign official’ for purposes of FCPA liability.” [In a footnote, Judge Matz noted, “[a]s discussed in the Addendum to this order, the Government never directly challenged that assumption until more than two weeks after the Court had issued its oral ruling denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss and trial had commenced.” (emphasis added)].
Judge Matz’s holding is as follows. “The Court denies the motion to dismiss, because a state-owned corporation having the attributes of CFE may be an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government within the meaning of the FCPA, and officers of such a state-owned corporation, as Messrs. Nestor Moreno and Arturo Hernandez are alleged to be, may therefore be ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”
As to the meaning of “instrumentality,” Judge Matz stated as follows. “Instrumentality is a noun having an inherently broad scope, but it is unnecessary for this Court to choose a particularly elastic dictionary definition of that word. Instead, the Court will adopt the very definition that Defendants themselves proffer.” Judge Matz then analyzed those definitions.
As to the FCPA’s legislative history, Judge Matz stated as follows. “It is unnecessary to base this ruling upon the legislative history of the FCPA, given that the meaning of ‘instrumentality’ under Defendants’ definition of the term clearly encompasses CFE. Nevertheless, because legislative history was so central to Defendants’ motion, the Court will summarize the parties’ contentions.”
After providing such a summary, Judge Matz stated in dicta as follows.
“The Court finds that the legislative history of the FCPA is inconclusive. Although it does not demonstrate that Congress intended to include all state-owned corporations within the ambit of the FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants’ insistence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations from the ambit of the FCPA.” (emphasis in original).
As discussed above, Judge Matz’s decision contains an Addendum. It begins as follows.
“After the jury trial had been underway for more than two weeks, and just before this order was to be filed, the Government asked the Court to take judicial notice of what the Government claims is this fact. ‘CFE was created by Mexico as a decentralized public entity with its own legal status and assets.’ In a footnote the Government added, ‘… [U]nder Mexican law, CFE is a decentralized public entity, not a corporation.’ This request is astounding.”
Judge Matz then stated, among other things, that:
“throughout the hundreds of pages of argument and exhibits that were filed as part of motion practice, the Government never stated that CFE is not a corporation;”
“nor did it assert that view at the hearing on this motion;”
“in a lengthy footnote in its opposition papers the Government stressed that in more than a dozen FCPA prosecutions, ‘guilty pleas were accepted by U.S. District Courts, involved bribery of officials of state-owned companies‘” (emphasis added)
“the Government cited two cases in which state-owned companies were found to fall within the scope of the FCPA” and the Government “cited and attached jury instructions in yet two additional cases, to the effect that ‘the definition of government instrumentality includes companies owned or controlled by the state;” (emphasis added)
“still later, the Government continued in this vein, purporting to refute the Defendants’ legislative history analysis by stressing that the author of the declaration that the Defendants’ cited ‘is unable to find a single reference … that Congress intended to exclude state-owned companies from the definition of instrumentality …'”; (emphasis added)
“the Government concluded , “from the FCPA’s inception, state-owned and state-controlled companies were within Congress’s intended definition of instrumentalities of a foreign government.'” (emphasis added).
Judge Matz then ends the Addendum as follows.
“There is nothing in the Government’s peculiar request for judicial notice which warrants a change in the foregoing ruling.”
No – The Consistent Answer In DOJ Responses to Senator Questions Regarding FCPA Reform
On November 30, 2010, the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs (chaired by then Senator Arlen Specter) held a hearing titled “Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” (See here for the prior post).
Following the hearing, Senator Christopher Coons and Senator Amy Klobuchar submitted written questions to Greg Andres (DOJ) – one of the witnesses who testified at the hearing.
The DOJ responses are here.
As evident from the DOJ responses, certain of which are highlighted below, the consistent DOJ response to FCPA-related reform proposals is no.
Profiled below are DOJ’s substantive responses to Senator questions regarding mandatory debarment for egregious FCPA violators; a potential FCPA compliance defense; a potential FCPA amnesty program; whether businesses face FCPA uncertainty; whether clarification of the “foreign official” element is needed; and whether the statute’s corporate intent element needs revising.
Mandatory Debarment
Does the DOJ favor a “mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery”?
No.
The DOJ says that such “mandatory debarment would likely be counterproductive, as it would reduce the number of voluntary disclosures and concomitantly limit corporate remediation and the implementation of enhanced compliance programs.”
In a related question, the DOJ adds that “a mandatory conduct-based debarment for companies could well have a negative impact on the Government’s ability to investigate and prosecute transnational corruption effectively.” “Linking mandatory debarment to a criminal resolution would fundamentally alter the incentives of a contractor-company to reach an FCPA resolution because such a resolution would likely lead to the cessation of revenues for a government contractor – a virtual death knell for the contractor-company. Similarly, mandatory debarment would impinge negatively on prosecutorial discretion. If every criminal FCPA resolution were to carry with it mandatory debarment consequences, then prosecutors would lose the necessary flexibility to tailor an appropriate resolution given the facts and circumstances of each individual case.”
Boiled down to one sentence, the DOJ’s opposition to mandatory debarment for egregious FCPA violators seems to be this – it would lessen our FCPA caseload, it would make our jobs more difficult, and it would take away our flexibility and leverage.
This is hardly a convincing argument to the position I articulated at the Senate hearing (see here) that “egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the offender.”
As I noted in this previous post, H.R. 5366 (which passed the House in September 2010) is not the answer. However, the issue of mandatory debarment, in certain instances, remains a valid and legitimate issue notwithstanding the DOJ’s responses.
Compliance Defense
Does the DOJ favor exploring a “formal compliance defense” to the FCPA?
No.
The DOJ “opposes the adoption of a formal compliance defense.”
According to the DOJ, it “already considers a company’s compliance efforts in making appropriate prosecutorial decisions, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines also appropriately credits a company’s compliance efforts in any sentencing determination.” “Among other things” the DOJ states, “the creation of such a defense would transform criminal FCPA trials into a battle of experts over whether the company had established a sufficient compliance mechanism.” “Against this backdrop, companies may feel the need to implement a purely paper compliance program that could be defended by an ‘expert,’ even if the measures are not effective in stopping bribery.” “If the FCPA were amended to permit companies to hide behind such programs, it would erect an additional hurdle for prosecutors in what are already difficult and complex cases to prove.”
As readers likely know, the U.K. Bribery Act, set to go live on July 1st, contains a so-called adequate procedures defense and such a defense should be considered under the FCPA as well.
Amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense is not a new idea. In the mid-1980’s numerous FCPA reform bills included such a defense and provided that a company would not be held vicariously liable for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by its employees or agents, who were not an officer or director, if the company established procedures reasonably designed to prevent and detect FCPA violations by employees and agents. In fact, an FCPA reform bill containing such a provision did pass the U.S. House.
A compliance defense is not about hiding behind “paper programs” as the DOJ asserts. Rather a so-called compliance defense, one that would be inapplicable in cases such as Siemens, it is about properly incentivizing corporate FCPA compliance and not putting a company at risk of FCPA scrutiny, costly FCPA internal investigations, and the growing collateral consequences of FCPA inquiries should a non-executive employee engage in conduct contrary to a company’s pre-existing, published, and trained on FCPA compliance policies and procedures.
Amnesty Program
Is the DOJ in favor of a so-called “amnesty program” as recently advocated by some?
No.
The DOJ says it “does not support the idea of an FCPA amnesty program.” Among other things, the DOJ says that “as the beneficiary of [several established sources of information such as voluntary disclosures] the Department does not presently face difficulty in identifying sources of information of FCPA criminal violations.” “Consequently, an amnesty program would provide protection for corporations who violate the law without providing accompanying meaningful benefits to law enforcement.” “Finally, consistent with the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the Department already provides meaningful credit for voluntary self-disclosures, extraordinary cooperation, and substantial remediation by corporations where appropriate and deserved.”
Uncertainty?
Does the DOJ believe that “well-meaning businesses are faced with significant uncertainty as to their potential exposure to civil and criminal penalties under the FCPA?”
No.
The DOJ says that “it provides clear guidance to companies with respect to FCPA enforcement through a variety of means.” It lists the DOJ’s Lay Person Guide to the FCPA, various charging documents, plea agreements, non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements [see here for a recent guest post on prosecutorial common law] and the DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases.
The DOJ concludes its response by saying “in the end, a review of the Department’s FCPA enforcement actions makes clear that companies have never been charged for minor or incidental issues.” “By contrast, the Department’s prosecutions involved extensive and often widespread corruption over significant periods of time.”
As explored in this prior guest post, in the FCPA’s 1988 amendments, Congress directed the DOJ to consider providing formal guidance. However, in 1990 the DOJ declined to issue guidelines and stated as follows. “After consideration of the comments received, and after consultation with the appropriate agencies, the Attorney General has determined that no guidelines are necessary…. [C]ompliance with the [anti-bribery provisions] would not be enhanced nor would the business community be assisted by further clarification of these provisions through the issuance of guidelines.”
“Foreign Official”
Does the DOJ agree that statutory clarification of “foreign official” would help clarify to businesses which of their transactions could be subject to the FCPA?”
No.
The DOJ response begins as follows. “The term ‘foreign official’ has been defined in relevant case law and opinion releases. Some defense attorneys have attempted to argue that the definition of ‘foreign official’ does not extend to the employees of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises.”
For the record, I am not a “defense attorney.” See here for my declaration as to the legislative history on “foreign official.”
In a related question, the DOJ further stated that it “has provided significant guidance regarding the definition of ‘foreign official.'”
Intent
Should the FCPA be amended to “bring the intent standard for corporations in line with the current ‘willfulness” standard that applies to individuals?”
No.
The DOJ responded that it “does not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to amend the FCPA’s intent standard with respect to corporations.” “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations already governs the Department’s decisions regarding whether to charge corporations for federal crimes, including under the FCPA.” “Furthermore, the Department is not prosecuting FCPA matters where a corporation engaged in something less than willful criminal conduct.”
Lindsey Defendants Move to Strike State Department “Foreign Official” Declaration *UPDATE* Judge Strikes State Department Declaration
Monday’s post (here) detailed the recent declaration by Clifton Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Legal Adviser’s Office of the United States Department of State in the Lindsey “foreign official” challenge pending in the Central District of California.
The Lindsey defendants have moved (here) to strike the State Department declaration. Among other arguments made, the Lindsey defendants state as follows.
“The opinion of one employee of the Department of State, or even of the Department of State as a whole, on the terms of the Convention and what the treaty required of the United States, as well as the meaning of the FCPA, a United States criminal statute, has no bearing on the matter before the Court. In any event, it is the job of the federal courts, not the executive branch, to be the final arbiter of what the FCPA actually provides. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).”
“On the other hand, the foreign policy implications of a particular interpretation, and how to deal with them, are the business of Congress and the President to address. Mr. Johnson’s suggestion to this Court to decide foreign policy is inappropriate. Courts concern themselves with the interpretation of the law as written. Congress is perfectly capable of amending the statute if it decides it is necessary to do so in light of a court’s decision. See generally McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (“If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly.”).”
Alternatively, the Lindsey defendants argue that if the Court is inclinded to consider the State Department declaration, that it should order Mr. Johnson to appear at the March 24th motion hearing. As noted in an exhibit to the motion to strike, the DOJ has stated that it “will not voluntarily produce Mr. Johnson as a witness at that hearing.”
*UPDATED*
In an order yesterday, presiding judge Howard Matz ordered (here) the State Department declaration be stricken.
For additional coverage see here.