Legislative History – Page 25

State Department Declaration in Lindsey “Foreign Official” Challenge

In its opposition brief (here) in the Lindsey “foreign official” challenge, the DOJ states at footnote 5:

“If this Court were to interpret the FCPA in such a way that officials of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises could not be foreign officials, the United States would be out of compliance with its treaty obligations under the OECD Convention. The government has requested a declaration from the State Department confirming this assessment and explaining its implications for U.S. foreign policy. Given the short response period, the declaration could not be finalized, but the government will endeavor to secure the declaration before argument on this motion and will file it if and when it is received.”

Last Friday, the DOJ filed a declaration by Clifton Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Legal Adviser’s Office of the United States Department of State – see here.

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Readers may also be interested in reviewing the OECD Convention (here) including commentary 15; a previous post (here) on the OECD Convention and U.S. positions; and a previous post (here) on how another OECD signatory country views the term “foreign public official.”

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer On ….

Earlier this week, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer spoke at the 3rd Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States Summit on Anti-Corruption. See here for his remarks.

Breuer’s remarks touched upon a number of topics including the following as excerpted below.

On Corruption Generally

“Corruption affects countries rich and poor, large and small, and it has particularly harmful effects on emerging economies. When a developing country’s public officials routinely abuse their power for personal gain, its people suffer. Roads are not built, schools lie in ruin, and basic public services go unprovided. And when corruption takes hold in any nation, its political institutions tend to lose legitimacy, threatening democratic stability and the rule of law. Corruption undermines the health of international markets, stifling competition and repelling foreign investment. Moreover, corruption is a ‘gateway crime, allowing money laundering, gang violence, terrorism and other crimes to thrive.”

On the FCPA’s Legislative History

“The FCPA was the first effort of any nation to specifically criminalize the act of bribing foreign officials. The statute was enacted in the wake of the “Watergate” scandal in the United States, which led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974 and resulted in a dramatic plunge in Americans’ overall trust in government. In 1976, following certain prosecutions for illegal use of corporate funds arising out of the Watergate scandal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or S.E.C., which regulates the securities industry in the United States, issued a “Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices.” In its report, the S.E.C. determined that foreign bribery by U.S. corporations was “serious and sufficiently widespread to be a cause for deep concern.” S.E.C. investigations revealed that hundreds of U.S. companies had made corrupt foreign payments involving hundreds of millions of dollars. With this background, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee concluded that there was a strong need for anti-bribery legislation in the United States. “Corporate bribery is bad business,” the committee said in its Report. “In our free market system it is basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet.””

“As the U.S. House of Representatives’ Report on the FCPA put it, a strong anti-bribery law can “help U.S. corporations resist corrupt demands.” In the words of the former chairman of a major oil company, quoted in the report, “If we could cite our law which says we just may not do it, we would be in a better position to resist” the pressure that sometimes comes from foreign officials. That was true in 1977, and it’s true now.”

On FCPA Enforcement

“The passage of the FCPA was a milestone. But the Act did not become a strong enforcement mechanism overnight. Indeed, in the first decades immediately following the law’s enactment, many saw the FCPA as a slumbering statute. That is no longer the case. In recent years, the Criminal Division has dramatically increased its FCPA enforcement efforts. To give you a sense: in 2004, we charged two individuals under the FCPA and collected around $11 million in criminal fines. In 2005, we charged five individuals and collected around $16.5 million. By contrast, in 2009 and 2010 combined, we charged over 50 individuals and collected nearly $2 billion.”

“The FCPA is a strong enforcement mechanism, and we are not shy about using it.”

On Holding Non-U.S. Actors Accountable

“We have traditionally also pursued foreign executives who work for U.S. corporations or for foreign corporations that trade on U.S. exchanges, as well as the foreign corporations themselves. For example, in 2007, Christian Sapsizian, a French citizen and former executive at Alcatel, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the FCPA, and in 2008 he was sentenced to 30 months in prison on those charges. In addition, we recently resolved a wide-ranging investigation against the Swiss-based freight-forwarding company Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., its U.S. subsidiary, and several foreign and domestic oil and gas service providers. Thus, as the Sapsizian and Panalpina cases show, any Russian citizen working for an American company in Russia or for a Russian company that trades on an American exchange, as well as any Russian company that trades on such an exchange, are also within our reach.”

“We have on more than one occasion brought charges against foreign officials under U.S. money laundering statutes, alleging that those officials laundered the proceeds of foreign bribery through U.S. financial institutions. In 2009, for example, we indicted two former Haitian government officials on money laundering charges for their alleged roles in a scheme to bribe officials of Haiti’s state-owned national telecommunications company. Thus, as the Haiti Teleco case shows, Russian officials who launder the proceeds of foreign bribes through U.S. financial institutions could also be liable for FCPA-related offenses.”

On the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative

“… Last year our Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section initiated a Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, which is designed to target and recover the proceeds of foreign official corruption that have been laundered into or through the United States. In November of 2009, at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity, in Qatar, Attorney General Holder pledged to redouble the United States’ commitment to recovering foreign corruption proceeds. The Kleptocracy Initiative represents a concrete step toward fulfilling that commitment; and once the initiative is fully implemented, it will allow the Justice Department to recover assets on behalf of countries victimized by high-level corruption.”

The Shrinking U.K. Bribery Act

Recent developments reported by the U.K. Telegraph suggest that when Bribery Act guidance is finalized and released, the Bribery Act will look very much like the FCPA. In fact, because of the Bribery Act’s adequate procedures defense and other hinted at limitations, the Bribery Act may turn out to be more lenient than the FCPA.

The Telegraph reported (here) that eventual guidance to be released by the U.K. government “will make allowances for the use of so-called ‘facilitating payments'” and that the guidance “will clarify how the law will view corporate hospitality and will give companies some protection against illegal acts committed by joint venture partners.”

According to the Telegraph, “the new guidance will acknowledge [facilitating payments] payments are a global problem that cannot be eradicated overnight.” According to the Telegraph, the eventual guidance “will say that while facilitating payments remain illegal, payments not considered ‘serious’ may not attract prosecution.”

This eventual guidance seems to be similar to the conclusion Congress arrived at in 1977 when enacting the FCPA. For instance, House Report No. 95-640 (September 28, 1977) states as follows:

“The language of the bill is deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between [corrupt payments] and facilitating payments, sometimes called ‘grease payments.’ […] For example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs document would not be reached by this bill. Nor would it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any event. While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments. As a result, the committee has not attempted to reach such payments.”

Even though the Bribery Act will still apparently prohibit facilitating payments – in contrast to the FCPA’s express facilitating payment exception – numerous prior posts (see here, here and here for example as well as all the CustomsGate enforcement actions) raise the issue of whether the enforcement agencies recognize such an exception and whether the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception has any real meaning.

The expected U.K. guidance on corporate hospitality would seem to be akin to the FCPA’s current affirmative defense for “reasonable and bona fide expenditures, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official” ” directly related to (A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency theorof.”

Without the benefit of an actual analysis of the expected guidance on joint ventures, it is a bit difficult to draw conclusions from the Telegraph article. But if, as reported, the eventual guidance “will give companies some protection against illegal acts committed by joint venture partners” this protection will make the Bribery Act even more lenient than the FCPA (or at least FCPA enforcement theories).

Several FCPA enforcement actions in recent years, including some of the most high profile (see e.g., Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement actions), have been based on conduct of joint venture partners.

Of note, the reported U.K. guidance regarding joint ventures would seem to conflict with the justification underlining the recent SFO charges against MK Kellog Ltd. under the Proceeds of Crime Act. (See here).

The oft-cited statement that the Bribery Act is the “FCPA on steroids” was curious to begin with; the statement now appears to be completely off-base given expected guidance on the Bribery Act.

President’s Day

Today is President’s Day.

This post highlights the role of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and William Clinton in enactment and subsequent development of the FCPA.

Ford

After watching Congress investigate and hold hearings on the foreign payments problem for approximately nine months, in March 1976 President Ford issued a “Memorandum Establishing the Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad” (see here).

The great debate at this time was whether the foreign payments problem should be addressed through a disclosure regime or through a criminalization regime. The Ford Administration favored the former and in June 1976, Ford released “Remarks Announcing New Initiatives for the Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad.” (see here). As noted in the remarks, Ford directed the task force “to prepare legislation that would require corporate disclosure of all payments made with the intention of influencing foreign government officials.”

Certain bills were introduced in Congress consistent with Ford’s vision and in August 1976 Ford issued “Foreign Payments Disclosure – Message From the President of the United States Urging Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Officials.” (see here).

Neither Ford’s proposal, or any other, was enacted by Congress prior to the 1976 elections in which Ford was defeated by Jimmy Carter.

Carter

Unlike the Ford Administration, the Carter administration favored the criminalization regime that was under consideration in the prior Congress and a movement that soon picked up speed when Congress reconvened in January 1977.

Certain members of the Carter administration testified at Congressional hearings throughout 1977 in favor of the criminalization regime and in December 1977, S. 305 (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977) was presented to President Carter.

On December 20, 1977, President Carter signed S. 305 into law – see here for his signing statement.

Reagan

As noted in this previous post, President Reagan’s administration very soon sought decriminalization of foreign payments subject to the FCPA. During the Reagan administration (1981-1989), numerous efforts were made in Congress to amend the FCPA. Soon after the FCPA was enacted, it was widely recognized that the FCPA had addressed a serious problem, but that the statute created much uncertainty and was, in the minds of many, unworkable.

Among other things, the FCPA antibribery provisions enacted in 1977 contained a broad knowledge standard (“reason to know”) applicable to indirect payments to “foreign officials”; (ii) did not contain any affirmative defenses; and (iii) did not contain an express facilitating payments exception. Beginning in 1980, various bills were introduced – either as stand alone bills or specific titles to omnibus trade and export bills – that sought to amend the FCPA. This legislative process took eight years.

In August 1988, President Reagan signed H.R. 4848 the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Title V, Subtitle A, Part I of the Act was titled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments.” President Reagan’s signing statement does not refer to the FCPA amendments buried in the omnibus trade bill. Among the amendments were a revised knowledge standard applicable to indirect payments and the creation of affirmative defenses and an express facilitating payment exception.

Clinton

In November 1998, President Clinton signed S. 2375, the “International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.” Among other things, the Act amended the FCPA by (i) creating a new class of persons subject to the FCPA – “any person” not an issuer or domestic concern to the extent such person’s bribery scheme has a U.S. nexus; and (ii) creating a new alternative nationality jurisdiction test for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns.

See here for President Clinton’s signing statement.

Will President Obama play a role in FCPA history?

The Akim Of Nookat, Lots Of Nigerian Customs Officials, The Congo Merchant Marine, And Lots Of Telecom Employees – The “Foreign Officials” Of 2010

A “foreign official”.

Without one, there can be no FCPA anti-bribery violation (civil or criminal).

Besides the fake Gabonese “foreign official” in the Africa Sting cases, who where the “foreign officials” of 2010?

This post describes the categories of “foreign officials” from 2010 corporate FCPA enforcement actions.

By my count, there were 21 corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2010 (DOJ and SEC). (See here for my SEC FCPA Enforcement Year in Review – stay tuned for a similar DOJ FCPA Enforcement Year in Review).

I excluded from the tally, the General Electric SEC enforcement action as it related only to Iraqi Oil for Food conduct (and alleged kickback payments to the Iraqi government – not to any specific “foreign official) and thus resulted in FCPA books and records and internal controls charges only. There were other Iraqi Oil for Food cases in 2010, including Innospec, Daimler, and ABB, but these enforcement actions stayed on the list because the allegations related to other conduct as well.

In addition to the GE action, there were two additional FCPA books and records and internal controls only cases in 2010 – Natco Group and Veraz Networks. However, these enforcement actions stayed on the list because, let’s face it, if an employee from either of these companies consistently entertained their brother-in-law in the corporate suite and sought reimbursement for “client entertainment” you wouldn’t be reading about it – even if such conduct would nevertheless likely constitute an FCPA books and records and internal control violation. In other words, Natco Group and Veraz Networks, even if only FCPA books and records and internal controls cases, remain very much about the “foreign officials” in those cases.

Of the 20 corporate enforcement actions, 12 enforcement actions (60%) involved (in whole or in part) employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (“SOE”). In these cases, the enforcement agencies generally allege that such enterprises are “instrumentalities” of a foreign government and that such employees are therefore “foreign officials” under the FCPA. However, as I noted in my prepared Senate testimony (here) this central feature of FCPA enforcement contradicts the intent of Congress in enacting the FCPA.

The 60% figure from 2010 FCPA enforcement is similar to the 66% figure I calculated from 2009 FCPA enforcement (see here pages 410-414). As in 2009, the impact of this dubious “foreign official” interpretation extends beyond corporate FCPA enforcement actions as this interpretation is also at the core of several individual FCPA prosecutions – most notably in 2010, the many individual prosecutions (Lindsey, Lee, Aguilars, O’Shea, and Basurto) involving officials of Comision Federal de Electricidad – an alleged Mexican SOE.

Not only did SOE employees comprise the bulk of “foreign officials” in 2010, but so too did individuals with apparent ministerial or clerical duties.

Of the 20 corporate enforcement actions, 10 enforcement actions (50%) – including most notably all the Panlapina-related enforcement actions – involved (in whole or in part) officials with apparent ministerial or clerical duties such as customs, immigration and tax matters

Why is this noteworthy?

The FCPA’s original definition of “foreign official” was as follows. “… any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency or instrumentality. Such terms does not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.”

This last sentence was the FCPA’s original (albeit indirect) facilitating payment or grease exception. The relevant House Report states in pertinent part as follows: “… a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs document would not be reached by this bill. Nor would it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must be performed in any event.”

When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 it, among other things, amended the definition of foreign official by removing this indirect facilitating payment exception from the “foreign official” definition by creating a stand-alone facilitating payment exception currently found in the statute.

The relevant House Report indicates that Congress did not seek to disturb Congress’s original intent. “The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in terms of both U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations considerations. Any prohibition under U.S. law against this type of petty corruption would be exceedingly difficult to enforce, not only by U.S. prosecutors but by company officials themselves. Thus while such payments should not be condoned, they may appropriately be excluded from the reach of the FCPA. U.S. enforcement resources should be devoted to activities have much greater impact on foreign policy.”

The remainder of this post describes (as per DOJ/SEC allegations) the “foreign officials” of 2010. As apparent from the descriptions below, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other instances with virtually no specificity.

Natco Group

Kazakhstan immigration authorities; employees of the Kazakh Ministry of Labor

Innospec

Iraqi Ministry of Oil and its component oil refineries (MoO) officials;

Official X of the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources who later became a senior official at BP Migas, an Indonesian state owned oil and gas company; officials at Pertamina, another state owned oil company related to BP Migas.

Daimler

Russian government officials employed at Russian government customers (Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian military, the City of Moscow, the City of Ufa, and the City of Novi Urengoi); Machinoimport and Dorinvest, both Russian government purchasing agents for the City of Moscow; Russian government officials employed by state-owned customers; Russian military officials; official with the Department of Communal Economy and Town Improvements for the City of Ufa, a Russian municipal government official; a senior municipal government official with the city of Novi Urengoi.

Chinese government customers – including principally the Bureau of Geophysical Prospecting, a division of the China National Petroleum Corporation, a Chinese state-owned oil company and Sinopec, a Chinese state owned energy company; Changqing Petroleum – a Chinese state-owned or controlled entity in the energy sector.

Saigon Passenger Transport Company a government entity in Vietnam; government official with the government owned Saigon High Tech Park; officials of a Vietnamese government office associated with import licensing; Ministry of Public Security official.

High-level executive official of Turkmenistan’s government; various officials of the Turkmenistan government.

Nigerian government officials; Nigerian officials to secure a State House (Nigerian Presidential Complex) contract; high-level executive branch official of Nigeria; chief buyer for the State House contract; Savannah Sugar Company Ltd – a Nigerian sugar company that was then majority owned by the Nigerian government; Nigerian police force; government official with the Ministry of Industry and an employee of the Ministry; Comite d’ Organisation de Jeux Africains – a state controlled agency organization committee for the All-Africa games; a senior Nigerian diplomat in Brazil.

Government officials at customers in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere in West Africa.

Ghanaian army officials.

Senior executive branch official in Liberia.

Members of the Riga City Council; members of the political party in control of the Riga City council; members of a different political party that was in control of the Riga City Council.

Volanbusz – a state owned regional public transport company in Budapest.

An executive of Mangyong Trading Corporation, an instrumentality of the North Korean government.

E.S.H.O.T. – a public transport agency for the municipality of Izmir in Turkey; Turkish police through the Ministry of Interior.

Perum Damri – an Indonesian state-owned bus company; tax officials in Indonesia.

Croatian government officials; Croatian Ministry of the Interior official; IM Metal – a Croatian government controlled and partially owned former weapons manufacturer and an instrumentality of the Croatian government.

Technip

“The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) was a
Nigerian government-owned company charged with development of Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth and regulation of the country’s oil and gas industry. NNPC was a shareholder in certain joint ventures with multinational oil companies. NNPC was an entity and instrumentality of the Government of Nigeria and officers and employees of NNPC were “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.” “Nigeria LNG Limited (‘NLNG’) was created by the Nigerian government to develop the Bonny Island Project and was the entity that awarded the related EPC contracts. The largest shareholder of NLNG was NNPC, which owned 49% of NLNG. The other owners of NLNG were multinational oil companies. Through the NLNG board members appointed by NNPC, among other means, the Nigerian government exercised control over NLNG, including but not limited to the ability to block the award of EPC contracts. NLNG was an entity and instrumentality of the Government of Nigeria and its officers and employees were “foreign officials.”

Nigerian government officials, including officials of the executive branch of the government of Nigeria; a political party in Nigeria; a senior official of the Ministry of Petroleum.

Eni / Snamprogetti

Same as Technip described above.

Veraz Networks

Employees of government-controlled telecommunications companies in China and Vietnam

Alliance One

“… The government of Kyrgyzstan established the Kyrgyz Tamekisi an agency and instrumentality of the government, to manage and control the government-owned share of the tobacco processing facilities throughout Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz Official A served as the General Director of the Tamekisi and as such was a foreign official within the meaning of the FCPA.” “In Kyrgyzstan, each municipal, district or provincial government unit was headed by a public official known as an “akim” who was appointed to the post by the President of Kyrgyzastan on the advice of the Prime Minister. Accordingly, the Akims were ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the FCPA. Each Akim could exercise authority over the sale of tobacco by the growers within the local geographical area.”

The following Akims are referenced: the Akim of Nookat; the Akim of Alabuka; the Akim of Alafuko; and the Akim of Chilik. Kyrgyz tax inspection police foreign officials.

“The government of Thailand established the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly as an agency and instrumentality of the government, to manage and control the government-owned tobacco industry in Thailand. The TTM supervised the cultivation of domestic tobacco crops, purchased imported tobacco and manufactured cigarettes and other tobacco products in Thailand. The TTM was headed by a managing director appointed by the Finance Ministry, who reported through a board of directors directly to the Minster of Finance of Thailand and, as such, was a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”

Universal

Same TTM officials as Alliance One.

Five Mozambiquen government officials and/or their family members; wife of an official in the Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; brother of an official in Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; Governor in Mozambique.

High-ranking Malawian government officials; political opposition leader.

ABB

“Comision Federal de Electricidad was an electric utlility company owned by the United Mexican states and responsible for supplying electricity to all of Mexico other than Mexico City. CFE officials N, J, C, and G held official positions a CFE and had influence over decisions concerning ABB’s contracts with CFE. CFE officials N,J,C and G, were “foreign officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA.”

Panalpina

“Officials of the Nigerian Customs Service [NCS], a Nigieran government agency within the Ministry of Finance of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The NCS was responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on goods imported into Nigeria. The NCS was an agency and instrumentality of the government of Nigiera and its employees were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA”; Nigerian government officials, most of the payments were paid to NCS officials; Nigeria Port Authority officials; Maritime Authority officials, police officials, Department of Peteroleum officials, immigration authority officials, and National Authority for Food and Drug Control officials;

“Nigerian National Petroleum Investment Management Services [NAPIMS] officials. NAPIMS is a component of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation [NNPC], a Nigerian government owned oil company, that supervises and manages Nigeria’s investment in the oil and gas industry. NNPC was an agency and instrumentality of the government of Nigiera and its employees were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA. As part of its oversight authority, NAPIMS officials had the authority to approve or disapprove logistics contracts awarded for joint venture projets. NAPIMS employees were foreign officials.”

Angolan government officials responsible for customs and immigration matters; Angolan government officials responsible for Angolan oil and gas operations; customs officials, Economic Police, Port Authority officials, and other Angolan officials; Angolan immigration and/or Ministry of Petroleum officials; Angolan military officials.

Azeri government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods; Azeri tax officials.

Brazilian government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods.

Kazakh government officials, including officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods and officials responsible for administering and enforcing Kazakh tax policy.

Russian government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties on imported goods.

Turkmen government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods to expedite the release of shipments and undocumented shipments and to cirucumvent the official Turkmen customs and immigration regulations; Turkmen government officials responsible for auditing, assessing, and collecting taxes on economic activity in Turkmenistan; and Turkmen government officials responsible for enforcing Turkmenistan labor, health, and safety laws.

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