In February 2026 Charles Hunter Hobson (who served in a variety of roles at Corsa Coal from 2013 to 2018) was found guilty by a jury for various Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related offenses in connection with an Egyptian bribery scheme.
With a motion for a judgment of acquittal pending, Hobson switched counsel and is now represented by R. McConnell Group attorneys Ryan McConnell, Matthew Boyden, and Larry Finder. This same group of attorneys recently represented FCPA defendant Ramon Alexandro Rovirosa Martinez (in April 2026, Judge Kenneth Hoyt (S.D. Texas) granted post-trial motions to dismiss and acquittal by Ramon Alexandro Rovirosa Martinez and ordered that he be released from prison).
New counsel drew the court’s attention to a June Supreme Court decision – Hunter v. U.S. – and how it “bears directly on how this case was litigated.”
Yesterday, and separate from the pending motion for a judgment of acquittal, Hobson filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s supervisory powers.
The motion begins:
“When confronted with coercive prosecutorial tactics . . . , the [Supreme] Court has often condoned those practices or let them pass in silence.” Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1715 (2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). This Term, it “begins to correct course.” Id.
This case is directly in Hunter’s cross hairs. The government improperly used a five-year-old proffer to deprive a United States citizen of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Its threats disabled the adversarial process throughout the trial. The government then cashed in on this unlawful effort, calling its proof “overwhelming and uncontradicted.” The government never sought a ruling that the proffer waiver was knowing, voluntary, triggered, or enforceable. Even if it had, Hunter confirms that a valid waiver does not compel enforcement. On a lesser record, where the court did rule and no proffer statement was ever admitted, the Second Circuit vacated and ordered a new trial. United States v. Oluwanisola, 605 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010).
At a minimum, Hobson is entitled to a new, fair trial—one in which he can confront the government’s witnesses, test its evidence, and present a defense without one hand tied behind his back. But the government’s deliberate actions warrant more. Hobson asks this Court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice under its supervisory power, protect the integrity of the federal courts, and prevent them from “making . . . themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law.” United States v. Bundy, 968 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
